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Abstract
In ad hoc networks, devices must cooperate in order to compensate for
the absence of infrastructure. Yet, autonomous devices are free to decide
whether to cooperate or not. Hence, incentives are indispensable to induce
cooperation between autonomous devices. Recently, several approaches have
been suggested that stimulate cooperation among devices. In this report,
we point out that these approaches fall short of exploiting the design space
of incentives for cooperation. Therefore, we introduce incentive patterns
as a means of systematically conceiving incentive schemes with respect to
the speciﬁcs of the application environment. Based on economics, we derive
several incentive patterns and discuss them with respect to a set of general
characteristics. Consequently, we propose a taxonomy that classiﬁes the de-
rived incentive patterns. Lastly, we exemplify systematic design of incentive
schemes in the context of our DIANE project.
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1 Introduction
Conventional networks know two types of devices. The ﬁrst type of devices
is infrastructural. Such devices ensure the operativeness of the network’s
services. For instance, dedicated repeaters, bridges, routers, gateways, and
servers are such infrastructural devices. The second type of devices is ap-
pendant to end users. Such devices make use of the network on behalf of
their users. Mobile phones are a good example of end user devices.
In the recent years, the need for infrastructureless networks has been
conjectured for some application areas, thus leading to the formation of a
research community for ad hoc networks. In the absence of infrastructural
devices, the end users’ devices have to take over infrastructural tasks in
order to ensure the network’s eﬀectiveness. Therefore, cooperation among
end users’ devices becomes necessary. However, the absence of infrastructure
implicates the lack of any centralized authority that enforces cooperative be-
havior of the participating devices. Therefore, the user assumes full control
of his device’s behavior. As a result, from a network point of view, the par-
ticipating devices are autonomous and, thus, they are free to decide whether
to cooperate or not.
Elementary Cooperation. A precise analysis of cooperation among de-
vices reveals the roles that an entity may assume. In [1], it is pointed out
that cooperation may be decomposed into a set of elementary cooperations.
As the elementary constituent of cooperation, an entity A acts on behalf
of an entity B. In the following, entity A is called agent entity and entity B
is referred to as principal entity. The action is part of the entities’ protocol
and is beneﬁcial to the principal entity. For example, a network protocol
entity, i.e. the agent entity, forwards packets on behalf of its sender, i.e. the
principal entity. Therefore, the principal entity remunerates the agent entity
and, thus, stimulates the agent entity’s action. The remuneration is ﬂexible,
if it is assessed situationally, e.g. by taking into account the scarceness of
the agent entity’s resources. In the following, cooperative behavior is treated
on the elementary principal-agent level. Figure 1 interrelates the proposed
terms.
agent
on device A
action
remuneration
principal
on device B
Figure 1: The terminology of elementary cooperation
In a service oriented perspective, the agent entity is the provider of a
service, i.e. the action, and the principal entity is the consumer.
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Uncooperative behavior. Due to the harsh resource constraints of wire-
less and/or mobile devices, the participating devices tend to maximize their
resources’ utility by exhibiting uncooperative behavior. Therefore, it has
been suggested to apply incentives for inter-device cooperation.
It is important to have a detailed understanding of the types of uncoop-
erative behavior in order to conceive an eﬀective incentive scheme. In [1], a
taxonomy of uncooperative behavior is proposed. It is shown in Figure 2. In
this context, proﬁtable and reasonable applies to the uncooperative protocol
entity. An eﬀective incentive scheme restrains misbehavior while exempting
venial noncooperation [1].
misbehavior
malicious behavior
lavish behaviorselfish behavior
unprofitableprofitable
by agent by principal
profitable misbehavior
uncooperative behavior
venial noncooperation
reasonableunreasonable
Figure 2: Taxonomy of uncooperative behavior
Outline. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the notion of incentive patterns and suggests a set of general
characteristics. Consequently, we introduce incentive patterns that are trust
based (Section 3) and trade based (Section 4). In Section 5, we propose a
taxonomy of incentive patterns and compare them to the aforementioned
characteristics. Section 6 exempliﬁes systemic design of incentive schemes
in the context of a case study. We review related approaches in Section 7.
Finally, we conclude the report in Section 8.
2 Incentives Patterns
Existing approaches apply various patterns of stimulating the agent’s ac-
tion. In this section, we introduce the notion of such incentive patterns and
point out the need for a thorough analysis of them. It shows that economic
incentive patterns are well understood and suﬃciently generic in order to
be applied to autonomous devices. Lastly, we suggest a set of general char-
acteristics that are required for the classiﬁcation of incentive patterns.
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2.1 Relevance of Incentive Patterns
In collective networks [1] like military networks, membership is a suﬃcient
incentive for cooperation. Yet, as the focus of ad hoc networks shifts from
military to civil applications, other incentives for cooperation become con-
ceivable. The classiﬁcation of existing incentive schemes in [1] applies the
notion of remuneration types in order to capture their key diﬀerences. It
shows that the remuneration types of the existing approaches are conﬁned
to reputation and checks. Furthermore, the approaches do not consider the
combination of diﬀerent remuneration types.
The notion of remuneration types is too narrow in order to encompass
all kinds of incentives for cooperation. For instance, membership might be
a suﬃcient incentive for cooperation, although there is no remuneration.
Consequently, we broaden the notion of remuneration types by introducing
incentive patterns.
Deﬁnition: An incentive pattern is a pattern of stimulating
cooperation. It comprises a set of abstract mechanisms that
incentive schemes may apply.
Obviously, incentive patterns also encompass patterns that stimulate
cooperation by the means of membership. If the characteristics of the re-
spective incentive patterns are known, incentive schemes may be conceived
more systematically by taking into account the speciﬁcs of the application
environment and matching them to appropriate incentive patterns. Such
systematic design of incentives for cooperation goes beyond the abstract
matching of [1], since it considers the speciﬁcs of the respective protocols.
In this report, we enlarge the design space of incentive schemes by sys-
tematically identifying and classifying further incentive patterns.
2.2 Economic Incentive Patterns
Networks of autonomous devices are strongly interrelated to economics with
regard to cooperation and its incentives. Both autonomous devices and
economics entities tempt to maximize the utility of their resources. Hence,
cooperation conﬂicts with the objective of the agent entity and, thus, has
to be stimulated by an incentive pattern.
The history of economics [2] has known several incentive patterns for
cooperation, i.e. the provision of goods and services. These incentive pat-
terns are well understood. It is known under which preconditions, e.g. trust
among the participating parties, and in which situations each one of them
evolved and was or is successfully used and what their limitations are. There-
fore, as a guideline for identifying and classifying incentive patterns, it seems
to be a promising idea to build a taxonomy of such economic incentive pat-
terns. This taxonomy should not be based on chronology, but on the char-
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acteristics that make a pattern usable or unusable in certain situations. We
will see that these characteristics are quite generic and describe networks of
autonomous devices as well as economics.
2.3 General Characteristics of Incentive Patterns
We propose a set of general characteristics that captures the speciﬁcs and
diﬀerences of incentive patterns.
Roles. In general, the incentive pattern stimulates an entity to act as
agent for a principal entity. Then, the roles of the cooperating entities are
asymmetric.
However, an incentive pattern may enforce that a principal entity has
to act for its agent at the same time. In such a case, the incentive pattern
imposes symmetric roles.
Remuneration. In most incentive patterns, the principal entity remuner-
ates the agent entity.
Type. Depending on the incentive pattern, remuneration assumes a
speciﬁc form that is called remuneration type [1]. Every remunerating in-
centive pattern introduces its own type. For instance, reputation and checks
are both remuneration types.
Granularity. Remuneration types diﬀer with respect to their inherent
granularity. The remuneration’s granularity is implied by the granularity of
the respective remuneration type. Hence, coarse remuneration types impose
constraints on remuneration assessment.
Assessment. The amount of the remuneration is assessed by the prin-
cipal entity and/or the agent entity. Assessment of ﬂexible remuneration,
i.e. pricing, is subject to the agent’s resources, the principal’s needs and the
market, i.e. supply and demand of the agent entity’s action.
Storage site. The remuneration is not necessarily obtained and stored
by the agent entity. The principal entity may also store a remuneration that
consists in remembering prior actions of the agent entity.
For some remuneration types, remuneration may be disseminated to
third parties.
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Coping with uncooperative behavior. An eﬀective incentive pattern
restrains uncooperative behavior except for venial noncooperation.
Malicious behavior is not proﬁtable for the malicious entity and, hence,
it is not part of the incentive pattern. However, detection and punishment
of malicious behavior demand for additional mechanisms of the incentive
pattern’s implementation, which are discussed in [1].
Selﬁsh behavior. The attractiveness of selﬁsh behavior is commonly
diminished by remunerating the agent entity.
Lavish behavior. The other way round, remuneration of the agent
entity keeps the principal entity from lavish behavior.
Venial Noncooperation. Only few incentive patterns adopt addi-
tional mechanisms in order to detect venial noncooperation.
In general, ﬂexible remuneration builds the foundation of coping with
asymmetric cooperation patterns. Then, the amount of remuneration re-
ﬂects the scarceness of resources [1].
Trust. Depending on the incentive pattern, trust either constitutes an
incentive for cooperation or it is a prerequisite for remuneration mechanisms.
Trust accrues from certiﬁcates (static trust) or prior experiences (dynamic
trust) [1].
Regardless of the incentive pattern, the principal entity has to ensure
that the agent entity fulﬁlls the respective action. For this purpose, the agent
has to collect proofs of his work. Mechanisms for collecting and validating
proofs of works do not depend on incentive patterns. Therefore, in this
report, we focus on trust that is necessary for assuring the validity of the
remuneration.
Trusted entity. The agent entity has to be convinced that its remu-
neration is valid and worthwhile. Depending on the incentive pattern, the
agent entity must trust the principal entity or third party entities.
Anonymity. Trust mechanisms may necessitate to disclose the iden-
tity of the principal or agent entity.
Scalability. In the context of this report, scalability refers to the number
of entities that apply the incentive pattern. As a rule of thumb, incentive
patterns do not scale well with the number of trusted entities. For instance,
payment with banknotes scales well, since the central bank is the only entity
that has to be trusted.
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Existing Approaches. Some incentive patterns are applied by several
incentive schemes, whereas there are some other patterns that have not been
applied yet. For each incentive pattern, the number of existing approaches
is a good indicator of the maturity of its implementation mechanisms. Since
our research is focussed on ad hoc networks, the approaches in other areas
are considered in Section 7.
3 Trust Based Incentive Patterns
In the following, we will identify and discuss incentive patterns. At ﬁrst,
we take a closer look on trust which is a straightforward incentive for co-
operation. In trust based incentive patterns, the agent entity executes the
demanded action, if it trusts the principal entity. Therefore, the principal
entity does not explicitly remunerate the agent entity. The agent’s trust in
the principal is twofold: The action is beneﬁcial for the agent either because
it trusts in sharing the same goals with the principal or because it believes
in increasing other entities’ cooperativeness.
3.1 The Collective Pattern
Incentive. A collective is a set of entities with mutual trust and uncondi-
tional cooperation. The incentive for cooperation in a collective stems from
being member of the same collective.
Properties. The agent entity does not need any remuneration, but it has
to ensure that the principal entity is part of the same collective. In general,
the entities in a collective share a common policy towards other entities or
collectives. In some cases, a collective may be self sustainable, i.e. its entities
do not rely on outside entities in order to accomplish their tasks. Because
of the mutual trust assumption, a collective does not scale well. Collectives
may be transient, i.e., exist for a limited time only. Entities may belong to
diﬀerent collectives simultaneously or at diﬀerent points in time.
Inter-collective cooperation is not part of the collective pattern. There-
fore, uncooperative behavior is interpreted as venial noncooperation. Since
the entities know and trust each other, they are willing to accept another
entity’s claim not to be able to cooperate at a certain point of time.
Being a set of entities, a collective is the generalization of an entity.
Hence, the following incentive patterns may be combined with the collective
pattern by applying the notion of agent and principal to collectives.
Economic example. A family or a small group of families forms a collec-
tive by exerting unconditional sacriﬁce and trust. A person can be part of
diﬀerent collectives at the same or consecutive points of time, e.g., through
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marriage. Individuals that at certain points of time are unable to oﬀer ser-
vices or goods to the collective, due to illness, old age or other reasons,
are not punished for this venial noncooperation, but are still able to obtain
services or goods from other members of the collective.
Collectives in networks of autonomous devices. In a network of au-
tonomous devices, a collective consists of devices of a person, a role, an
organization or even of a group of collectives.
Collectives may be transient, i.e. temporally bounded, or partial, i.e.
encompassing only parts of the cooperation. For instance, collaborating
students in learning groups might constitute a transient collective. Further-
more, such a collective is partial, since its cooperation scope is restricted to
collaborative learning.
A device is allowed to fail to cooperate with its collective, as far as its
membership is not cancelled. Thereby, devices cooperate depending on their
available resources.
Existing approaches in ad hoc networks. Military, corporate, private
and sensor ad hoc networks are collective networks [1] and, thus, apply the
collective pattern. We have to note that these approaches often do not have
an explicit notion of incentives for cooperation. For example, it is often
assumed that the whole network itself is a collective.
3.2 The Community Pattern
Incentive. A community is a group of entities whose incentives for coop-
eration are based on the local reputation gained by acting as agent entity
to other entities of the community. Good reputation is required in order to
initiate services of other entities.
Properties. Collectives lack incentives for inter-collective cooperation. In
a community, the principal entity estimates the value of the action, and re-
munerates the agent entity by increasing its local reputation accordingly.
Other entities may also increase the agent’s local reputation in case of sniﬀ-
ing [1], i.e. listening to messages or negotiations that are destined for other
entities. Optionally, the agent entity diminishes the reputation of the prin-
cipal entity in order to punish lavish behavior.
An entity’s reputation is only remembered by entities that cooperated
before as agent or principal and, in case of sniﬃng, by other collectives in
the proximity. Therefore, good reputation only pays oﬀ in communities with
stable or localized interaction patterns [1]. Otherwise, reputation becomes
ineﬀective and, thus, agent entities are subject to adverse selection [3]. As a
result, a community scales badly with respect to the number of its entities.
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In order to further restrain selﬁsh and lavish behavior, local reputations
are generally disseminated throughout the community. Then, entities have
access to the global reputation of an arbitrary entity. However, dissemina-
tion of local reputation requires mechanisms to counter malicious behavior
like defamation and unjustiﬁed praising.
Since the principal assesses the value of an action, pricing is independent
of the agent’s resources. Consequently, asymmetric resources and usage pat-
terns and, thus, venial noncooperation are not taken into account. Sniﬃng
is the only means of detecting venial noncooperation.
In the presence of collectives, the community pattern may be under-
mined, e.g. by a collective that initiates actions on behalf of its only entity
with good reputation. Hence, the incentive patterns should be coupled by
assigning reputation to collectives instead of entities.
In communities, trust is tightly coupled with the remuneration type, i.e.
reputation. Other incentive patterns may employ mechanisms of communi-
ties for experience based trust management.
Economic example. In a historic perspective, a community is formed by
a group of neighboring villages or families that interchange their goods as
gifts [2].
Existing approaches in ad hoc networks. The classiﬁcation of exist-
ing incentive schemes in ad hoc networks [1] points out that the commu-
nity pattern is predominant. The existing approaches are RPG [4], Watch-
dog/Pathrater [5], CONFIDANT [6] and CORE [7, 8].
4 Trade Based Incentive Patterns
In contrast to trust based incentive patterns, explicit remuneration of the
agent entity might be desirable. Such explicit remuneration consists of an
action in return by the principal on behalf of the agent. Incentive patterns
that are based on this principle are depicted as trade based incentive patterns.
We diﬀerentiate between two types of trade. The principal might ex-
ecute the action in return immediately during or after the agent’s action.
Alternatively, the principal might promise the action in return so that it is
deferred.
4.1 Immediate Action in Return
The assumption of mutual trust may be too restrictive in some networks.
This is especially true for highly volatile networks that restrict inter-device
cooperation to one or two elementary cooperations. In such a case, an
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incentive pattern is needed that does not assume any future cooperation in
order to stimulate cooperation.
A straightforward solution to this problem consists of abandoning the
asymmetry of the agent-principal pair. This is done by superposing two ele-
mentary cooperations, so that each entity is agent and principal at the same
time. An incentive pattern that presumes such superposing is symmetric.
4.1.1 The Barter Trade Pattern
Incentive. Barter trade is deﬁned as the direct exchange of actions. There-
fore, the principal entity remunerates the agent entity by acting simultane-
ously as an agent, i.e. executing an action in return.
Properties. The bad scalability of communities ensues from the temporal
uncoupling of the initial action and the action in return. Therefore, the
barter trade incentive pattern insists on a prompt action in return by the
principal entity. Hence, selﬁsh and lavish behavior is eﬀectively restrained.
In barter trade, the two participating entities may remain anonymous.
Trust is only required, if the action in return is not executed simultaneously.
Consequently, barter trade scales better than prior incentive patterns.
An entity only acts as agent, if it is interested in an action of the principal
entity. Therefore, the principal might have to arrange appropriate actions
by trading with third parties ﬁrst. However, traded actions may be cumber-
some, i.e. spatially or temporally extended. If collectives are composed of a
large number of entities, there are better prospects of ﬁnding an appropriate
action in return. In any case, the atomicity of barter is even more diﬃcult
to achieve. As a prerequisite, trading partners have to remain within reach
during the trade. Furthermore, mechanisms are needed to enforce the pro-
vision of the action in return, thus avoiding lavish behavior.
In barter trade, the roles of the two participating entities are inherently
symmetric. Such symmetry is not suitable for inherent asymmetry and,
thus, venial noncooperation. However, the heterogeneity of resources and
usage patterns might be levelled in collectives.
The assessment of the remuneration is bound to the granularity of the
action in return which may be too coarse. The negotiation and assessment
of the remuneration is complex because two actions are assessed at the same
time.
In practice, potential principals acquire reference actions that are re-
quired by every entity in order to execute an appropriate action in return.
Ideally, such reference actions are suﬃciently ﬁne granular and not cumber-
some. Then, they may be used as a currency.
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Economic example. The cowrie1 has been a reference good [2]. Coins of
precious metal mark the transition to the banknotes of Section 4.2.3.
Barter trade in networks of autonomous devices. In the context of
networks of autonomous devices, cumbersome actions are resource intensive
or temporally extended actions, e.g. a internet gateway.
In general, symmetric roles do not match cooperation patterns. Yet as an
exception, network protocol entities exhibit symmetric roles by exchanging
link state packets in table driven routing protocols [1].
Apart from packet forwarding, it is diﬃcult to conceive reference actions.
Due to its importance to most of the devices in an ad hoc network, energy
exchange would be a perfect match as reference action. However, this is
technically not feasible.
4.2 Deferred Action in Return
In general, barter’s superposing of two elementary cooperations is infeasible,
since the agent entity normally does not need an immediate action in return.
Yet, given the fact that the agent entity is likely to act as principal entity in
a subsequent elementary cooperation, it might be stimulated by promising
an action in return in the future.
Bond based incentive patterns stipulate that the principal entity hands
over a bond that promises an action in return to the agent entity. In the
following, we identify and discuss four bond based incentive patterns and, in
addition, propose a classiﬁcation of them.
4.2.1 The Bearer Notes Pattern and the Bearer Bills Pattern
Incentive. The principal entity remunerates the agent entity by handing
over a bearer note or a bearer bill. A bearer note is a promise to execute
particular actions on behalf of its bearer on demand once in the future. A
bearer bill is an order by a entity upon another entity, i.e. the debtor, to
execute particular actions to the bill’s bearer on demand once in the future.
Properties. In contrast to barter trade, bearer notes and bills uncouple
the initial action and the action in return. Furthermore, the agent is in
possession of its remuneration, as opposed to communities. In bearer bills,
the debtor is an arbitrary third party, whereas the debtor of a bearer note is
the principal entity. After acquisition of its remuneration, the agent entity
may remunerate another entity by passing on the bearer note/bill.
In general, the promised actions in return are reference actions and, thus,
ﬁne granular. Furthermore, the remuneration is not bound to the granularity
1cowrie: any of various marine gastropods (family Cypraeidae) that are widely dis-
tributed in warm seas and have glossy and often brightly colored shells. [9]
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of the promised action in return, if the remuneration consists of fractions
of actions. This makes sense for entities that accumulate several notes and
bills before honoring them at the debtor.
For bearer bills, the agent has to ensure that the debtor exists and is
willing to execute the promised action in return on behalf of the bill’s issuer.
For bearer notes, the issuer assumes the role of the debtor. In general, the
issuer and debtor of the note/bill have to disclose their identity in order to
prove their trustworthiness. The trust assumption imposes restrictions on
the scalability.
Since reference actions are uniformly assessed, the pricing of the initial
action is transparent, so that market mechanisms become eﬀective. In ad-
dition, the agent demands an extra charge for the deferment of the action
in return and for assuming the risk that the note/bill is valid.
Because of market pricing, an action is not executed, if the agent entity’s
resources are too expensive, and it is not initiated, if the remuneration is
not adequate to the principal entity’s needs. Therefore, selﬁsh and lavish
behavior is eﬀectively restrained. However, the debtor has to be trusted
in order to keep the issuer from lavishness. Bearer bills allow for venial
noncooperation, if the issuer suﬃciently stimulates its debtor to execute the
action in return.
Bearer notes diﬀer from communities with regard to one characteristic.
For bearer notes, the remuneration is stored on the agent, whereas, in com-
munities, it is stored on the principal. Bearer notes facilitate market pricing,
as opposed to communities. Both bearer notes and communities encourage
the principal to change its identity, whereas the agent is eager to keep its
identity in order to be able to initiate an action in return.
Economic example. In economics, a more general form of the bearer
note and bill are the promissory note2 and the exchange bill3 respectively.
They became popular in the large medieval trading networks [2].
Notes and Bills in networks of autonomous devices. Notes and
bills call for a cryptographic infrastructure that renders forging infeasible.
However, such an infrastructure puts further strain on the devices’ limited
resources.
The distinction of issuer and debtor makes sense for ad hoc networks.
For example, the PDA may act as principal while promising an action in
return by the laptop. Then, the laptop is stimulated by any other incentive
pattern, e.g. it is member of the same collective as the PDA.
2A written promise to pay at a fixed or determinable future time a sum of money to a
specified individual or to bearer [9].
3An order by a creditor upon his debtor to pay to a third party designated, or even to
any third party, the bearer, a part or the whole of the debt owing [10].
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4.2.2 The Banking Pattern
Incentive. In banking, every entity possesses a bank account. The prin-
cipal entity remunerates the agent entity by issuing a check, i.e. a bearer
bill, the debtor of which is a bank. The check bearer presents the check to
its bank, so that its account is credited. If the check bearer’s bank diﬀers
from the principal entity’s one, an inter-bank transaction is required.
Properties. The execution of reference actions is restricted to account
deposit and withdrawal. Since the granularity of a check is not bound to a
feasible fraction of reference actions, the granularity of remuneration assess-
ment becomes arbitrary.
Bearer bills come along with a high risk of validity, since the debtor has
to be known and trusted by the agent. In banking, the set of debtors is
restrained to banks and, thus, it is considerably reduced. Therefore, the
banking pattern scales better than the bills pattern. However, its scale is
bound to the accessibility of banks and the scale of inter-bank transactions.
Since banks are generally more trusted than common entities, the extra
charge for the risk of check validity is lower than for bills. However, the bank
only credits the agent’s account, if the check is covered and the agent’s bank
is able to transact with the principal’s bank. Furthermore, banking demands
for liquidity, i.e. a suﬃcient cushion of the check bearer’s account, because
the bearer might not be able to hand it over to its bank immediately after
acquisition. Consequently, checks still contain a considerable extra charge
for their risk and liquidity demands.
Compared to bearer bills, lavish behavior is further restrained, since
the bank generally knows the identity of its account holders. Therefore,
proﬁtable misbehavior will rebound on the respective entity.
Even in case of market pricing, it is diﬃcult to balance the accounts of
entities that are inherently agents or principals. This is especially important
for entities that are subject to frequent venial noncooperation.
As it is true for notes and bills, the issuer and debtor of checks have to
disclose their identity. Yet, banks are not reluctant to disclose their identity,
so that anonymity of the debtor is not a concern any more.
Economic example. The description of banks, accounts and checks is
directly applicable to nowadays’ economy.
Banking in networks of autonomous devices. The accessibility of
banks is crucial for the application of the banking pattern. An account may
be managed by a hardware module on the account holder’s device. Such a
module is delivered by the respective bank, since it comprises system critical
functionality, i.e. the issuing and conversion of checks. Consequently, the
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banks are distributed to the devices. If accounts are held by collectives in-
stead of entities, a collective’s account either is distributed among its entities
which requires synchronization, or it is assigned to a dedicated entity of the
collective. The latter option takes advantage of inherent asymmetry within
a collective, but it is bound to the connectivity to the dedicated entity.
Obviously, banking requires a cryptographic infrastructure in order to
be dependable.
Existing approaches in ad hoc networks. In [1], incentive schemes
that apply the banking pattern are depicted as account based. The list of
such approaches encompasses TermiNodes [11, 12], APE [13] and Sprite [14].
TermiNodes is the only approach that distributes accounts.
4.2.3 The Banknotes Pattern
Incentive. The principal entity remunerates the agent entity by handing
over banknotes, i.e. bearer notes issued by a central authority.
Properties. On contrary to bearer notes, banknotes are pre-issued by a
commonly trusted central authority. Therefore, the agent’s remuneration
generally consists of several banknotes. Its assessment is bound to the pre-
deﬁned granularity of banknotes.
Since banknotes are transferable and issued by a trusted authority, the
extra charge for the bearer’s consumption deferment and the risk of validity
is negligible. Furthermore, it is not required that the central authority
is accessible, hence the banknote incentive pattern scales better than the
banking pattern.
Banknotes enforce the principal’s anonymity, since they are issued by a
third party. However, the agent has to trust in the banknotes’ genuineness.
Therefore, either banknotes are unforgeable or, in case of infeasibility of the
unforgeability assumption, the principal has to be trusted, which hinders its
anonymity.
As for uncooperative behavior, the discussion for banking also applies to
the banknotes pattern.
Economic example. In history, central reserve banks issued banknotes
that promise reference goods, e.g. gold, on its presentation.
4.2.4 Classiﬁcation
The bearer notes/bills, banking and banknotes incentive patterns share sev-
eral properties. Nevertheless, these incentive patterns are clearly distin-
guishable with regard to their key properties. On the one hand, the issuer
may or may not embody the role of the bond’s debtor. In the latter case,
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it is promised that a third party executes the action in return. On the
other hand, the debtor’s role may or may not be assumed by a dedicated
third party. Such dedicated third parties are banks in the banking pattern
and central authorities in the banknotes pattern. Figure 3 illustrates the
proposed classiﬁcation of bond based incentive patterns.
banking patternbearer bills patternis not debtor
banknotes patternbearer notes patternis debtor
Dedicated
third party
Any
party
Debtor
Issuer
Figure 3: Bond based incentive patterns
5 Taxonomy and Characteristics of Incentive Pat-
terns
In the last sections, we identiﬁed seven incentive patterns in order to capture
and enlarge the design space of incentive schemes. Yet, the ultimate goal of
incentive patterns is to systematically conceive incentive schemes by taking
into account the speciﬁcs of the application environment and matching them
to appropriate incentive patterns. Therefore, in this section, we classify the
proposed incentive patterns and summarize their characteristics in order to
clarify their interrelationship and applicability.
5.1 A Taxonomy of Incentive Patterns
In Figure 4, a taxonomy of the proposed economic incentive patterns is
given. In trust based incentive patterns, the agent entity is stimulated by
the trust it has in the principal entity. Trust either accrues from mem-
bership (collective pattern) or it is subject to entities’ behavior and, thus,
adapts dynamically (community pattern). On contrary, in trade based in-
centive patterns, the agent entity is stimulated by an action in return that
is either executed simultaneously (barter trade pattern) or promised (bond
based incentive patterns).
5.2 Characteristics of Incentive Patterns
The main properties of the proposed incentive patterns are summarized in
Table 1. A comparison of the community pattern and the banking pattern
is found in [1].
The collective and community pattern seem to be too restrictive with
regard to their scalability and fuzzy accounting. However, they are easy
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trade based patternstrust based patterns
stimulated by
trust
stimulated by
action in return
incentive patterns
community patterncollective pattern
static remunerating(dynamic)
bond based patterns
immediate deferred
barter trade pattern
Figure 4: Taxonomy of incentive patterns
to implement and can be combined with other patterns. On the one hand,
collectives generalize the notion of entities and, thus, introduce consideration
of inherent asymmetry and venial noncooperation to a certain degree. On
the other hand, communities merge remuneration and trust management.
Therefore, their mechanisms provide a sound basis for experience based trust
in other incentive patterns.
Barter trade exhibits several characteristics that are desirable for ad hoc
networks since it is:
• anonymous: The participating entities do not have to disclose their
identity.
• oﬄine: Cooperation and remuneration do not require interaction with
speciﬁc third parties.
• persistent: The remuneration is eﬀective, even if the participating
entities are disconnected immediately after their cooperation.
• scalable: The incentive pattern may be eﬀectively applied by a large
number of entities.
However, for most cooperation patterns, it is infeasible to execute a
simultaneous action in return. Even so, the exchange is unlikely to be fair
due to the actions’ granularity.
Therefore, the remaining incentive patterns compensate for these disad-
vantages by introducing various bonds. However, the desirable characteris-
tics of barter trade then become unsustainable.
Persistence calls for a third party that is often accessible and provides
the promised action in return. Furthermore, trust intensive roles are dele-
gated to such a third party, in order to maintain anonymity of the principal
and agent. By doing so, bearer notes and bills are specialized to banknotes
and checks. On the downside, the introduction of a third party is in con-
trast to the oﬄine criterion. Conceptually, the transferability of checks
and banknotes solves this problem. Yet, the implementation of checks and
banknotes is further complicated by their transferability [1].
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Table 1: Characteristics of incentive patterns
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1 Requires dissemination of reputation.
2 Limited to observable behavior by the means of sniﬃng.
3 If re-trading of actions is required.
4 In addition, there is an extra charge for liquidity, i.e. the ability to defer con-
sumption or a cushion on the bank account, and for the risk of validity which is
determined by the agent.
5 The agent by default.
6 If it is feasible to forge banknotes.
6 Incentive Patterns for DIANE: A Case Study
The enlarged set of incentive patterns renders design decisions of incentive
schemes more complex. In this context, the classiﬁcation of incentive pat-
terns with respect to a set of general characteristics is especially helpful,
since it allows for a straightforward matching of application environments
and incentive patterns.
In this section, we take a closer look at incentive patterns in the con-
text of our DIANE project [15]. Therefore, we examine the speciﬁcs of our
project, so that we are able to identify the project’s demands and restric-
tions with respect to incentive patterns. We will see that the restrictions
considerably conﬁne the set of applicable incentive patterns. On the other
hand, there are desirable properties for DIANE that the applicable incen-
tive patterns cannot meet. Therefore, we point out which restriction should
be dropped in order to facilitate the application of incentive patterns that
exhibit these desirable properties.
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6.1 Specifics of the Application Environment
For the future, the availability of a ubiquitous infrastructure like UMTS
is projected [16]. Even at present, there exists a WLAN infrastructure in
our campus [17]. Yet, in the ﬁrst step, our DIANE project is focussed on
ad hoc networks that might be permanently disconnected from any ﬁxed
infrastructure. Therefore, we aim at identifying the potentials and limits of
such ad hoc networks. We believe that ad hoc networks remain relevant in
the presence of infrastructure for a set of reasons, i.e. energy and bandwidth
eﬃciency, anonymity, autonomy and locality. Consequently, accessibility of
certain entities cannot be assumed by the incentive scheme of DIANE.
Our project DIANE aims at facilitating the integrated use of students’
devices that form an ad hoc network. This includes eﬃcient usage of re-
sources. Therefore, the application of ﬂexible remuneration is highly desir-
able.
In contrast to ad hoc networks that aim at a commercial use, the incen-
tives for user cooperation are not restricted to economic ones, i.e. money.
In our university environment, students care about their grades and about
their reputation. Such university speciﬁc incentives for user cooperation
outweigh economic ones in our DIANE project.
The DIANE project aims at conceiving and distributing a suitable soft-
ware to the students. However, the supply of hardware is out of DIANE’s
scope. Therefore, the DIANE incentive scheme may not depend on tamper
resistant hardware. Since the protocol stack of the DIANE ad hoc network
is not protected on a hardware module, it may be altered by the means of
reverse engineering. Even worse, the incentive scheme itself might be al-
tered or incapacitated. Although reverse engineering requires considerable
technical skills, an alternate protocol stack might still be available to the
mass of students, if it is conceived and distributed by a capable student.
6.2 Applicable Incentive patterns for DIANE
As it comes to the choice of appropriate incentive patterns, the project
environment imposes severe restrictions:
• The incentive scheme cannot rely on the accessibility of certain entities.
• The incentive scheme may not depend on tamper resistant hardware.
• The protocol stack and the incentive scheme may be altered by the
means of reverse engineering.
Obviously, the incentive scheme has to be fully oﬄine, distributed and
alterable. The known implementations of the banking incentive pattern can-
not deal with such an environment, since neither the banker nodes of APE
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nor the credit clearance system of Sprite nor the security modules of TermiN-
odes are disposable [1]. For the banknotes pattern, it is still unclear how
to conceive an implementation that supports transferability but restrains
double spending in permanently oﬄine environments. The same applies to
bearer notes/bills, since they are transferable. In any case, double spending
cannot be prevented thus calling for distributed detection protocols or, at
least, a tight coupling with the trust mechanisms.
The barter trade pattern is of no importance, because symmetric coop-
eration patterns are not prevalent in DIANE. Therefore, there only remain
trust based incentive patterns, i.e. the collective and community pattern. It
would be a sound assumption that the DIANE ad hoc network is a corporate
ad hoc network and, thus, a collective network. Yet, our project requires
a remunerating incentive scheme that is able to integrate with the existing
remunerating incentives for user cooperation. As a result, the community
pattern ﬁts best to the DIANE environment.
The community pattern in DIANE. Obviously, the applicable incen-
tive patterns, i.e. notes/bills and trust based incentive patterns, do not scale
well. Furthermore, the most practical incentive pattern, i.e. the community
pattern, has considerable drawbacks. More speciﬁcally, in communities, the
remuneration is assessed solely by the principal, so that ﬂexible remunera-
tion cannot be applied. The integration with a university speciﬁc incentive
scheme on the user layer, e.g. grades, also seems daunting. Nevertheless,
the locality assumption of communities makes sense in the DIANE environ-
ment, since the set of DIANE enabled students is rather stable, as it is true
for inter-student cooperation.
User acceptance constitutes an important criterion during the concep-
tion and implementation of the DIANE incentive scheme. More speciﬁcally,
the users intend to assume a certain degree of anonymity. Yet, the users’
desire for anonymity is in opposition to the community pattern’s need for
reliable identities. On the one hand, the user does not want to disclose
his identity, e.g. by having to provide his matriculation number. On the
other hand, the community pattern becomes ineﬀective, if participants are
allowed to change their identities [18]. It is a sound approach to restrict
anonymity in the DIANE ad hoc network to its level in existing student
practices. More precisely, the students are used to be identiﬁed by their
appearance and by their name or nickname. Therefore, it seems promising
to deﬁne a student’s identity by a picture and a pseudonym. This suits well
to the community pattern, since students are able to identify other students
that they have heard of or seen before. Still, students have to be kept from
changing their identity. Static trust mechanisms provide such means. For
example, a student’s identity may be established and certiﬁed during ini-
tialization of the DIANE software on his devices. In addition, a student
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obtains his private key that is certiﬁed together with his identity, so that
only he himself is able to claim his identity. Yet, such an approach comes
with several drawbacks. The operation of the public key infrastructure puts
severe resource constraints on devices. Furthermore, in an oﬄine ad hoc
network, the conventional mechanisms of certiﬁcate revocation cannot be
applied. In addition, a student is able to place his identity at disposal of
other students by transferring it to them, because his private key is not
protected on a dedicated hardware. Lastly, the central entity that initially
deploys the DIANE software on devices has to keep track of the identities of
students, in order to restrain multiple applications for identities by one stu-
dent. Therefore, a mapping of DIANE identities to matriculation numbers is
maintained, which, even though only being accessible by the administrator,
might deteriorate user acceptance.
Tradeoﬀ between restrictions and desirable properties. Either one
of the three restrictions imposed by the project environment is dropped
or the integration with university speciﬁc, e.g. grades, and economic, e.g.
money, incentive schemes is abandoned. In the future, it remains to be seen
which restrictions of the project environment may be dropped in order to
attain desirable properties of the DIANE incentive scheme. For example, if
occasional accessibility of certain entities may be assumed, further incentives
for user cooperation may be integrated and ﬂexible remuneration becomes
applicable.
7 Related Work and Contribution
Incentives are applied whenever the utility of autonomous devices has to
be inﬂuenced for eﬀectiveness or eﬃciency reasons. In economics, incentives
assume a predominant role, hence their design has been thoroughly analyzed
[19]. However, due to the ubiquity of the banknotes pattern in economics,
existing work is not focussed on the choice of appropriate incentive patterns
and, thus, abstracts from them. For MAS, there are several approaches
that assume the economic perspective in order to apply incentives. All of
them presume the availability of a robust payment scheme, which introduces
a speciﬁc form of remuneration and generally requires a central authority.
Thus, the approaches’ design of incentive schemes is not contingent upon
speciﬁc incentive patterns. A generic study of conceiving incentive schemes
based on the economic public good theory is found in [20]. For peer-to-
peer networks, ﬁle sharing incentive schemes have been proposed [21, 22].
Incentive Schemes for eﬃcient resource allocation are conceived in agoric
computing [23, 24]. The transactional exchange of action and remuneration
is analyzed in [25] regardless of the respective incentive pattern.
On the other hand, several related approaches restrain to the applica-
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tion and implementation of one speciﬁc incentive pattern. For peer-to-peer
networks, there is ongoing research on distributed reputation systems [18]
which are needed for the implementation of the community pattern. Mojo
Nation [26] applies the barter trade pattern and the banking pattern. The
implementation of the banking and banknotes incentive patterns is discussed
in [27]. A classiﬁcation of incentive schemes for ad hoc networks is given in
[1]. We already referred to them throughout this report.
To our knowledge, incentive patterns have not yet been compiled and
discussed with regard to their characteristics and applicability to a speciﬁc
domain. This report does so with a stress on ad hoc networks of autonomous
devices. Therefore, it closes the gap between economic approaches that
conceive incentives by determining the appropriate amount of remunerations
and, on the other hand, approaches that examine how speciﬁc incentive
patterns may be implemented.
8 Conclusion
Autonomous devices are free to decide whether to cooperate or not. There-
fore, in the absence of infrastructure, incentives are indispensable for coop-
eration between autonomous devices. In this report, we pointed out that
existing incentive schemes fall short of exploiting the design space of in-
centives for cooperation. Therefore, we introduced incentive patterns as a
means of systematically conceiving incentive schemes with respect to the
speciﬁcs of the application environment. We suggested a set of general
characteristics that are required for the classiﬁcation of such incentive pat-
terns. Based on economics, we derived several incentive patterns. At ﬁrst,
we introduced trust based incentive patterns that do not stipulate explicit
remuneration. It shows that trust based incentive patterns assume a certain
degree of stability. This assumption is not made by the barter trade pattern
that enforces an immediate action in return by superposing elementary co-
operations. Since an immediate action in return is often infeasible, it might
be promised in the form of a bond. Consequently, we identiﬁed and classi-
ﬁed four bond based incentive patterns. We captured the interrelationship
of incentive patterns by proposing a taxonomy and summarizing their char-
acteristics. Finally, we exempliﬁed systematic design of incentive schemes
in the context of a case study. Therefore, we examined the speciﬁcs of our
DIANE project and matched them to the incentive patterns.
In the future, we plan to thoroughly analyze the applicability of incen-
tive patterns that are not used in any existing approach yet. Furthermore,
studies in economics might reveal further incentive patterns and guidelines
of their applicability. In addition, it seems promising to consider composi-
tion of incentives patterns in order to combine their strengths. The necessity
of such pattern composition becomes apparent for the bearer bills pattern,
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since a third party debtor remunerates the agent and, thus, has to be stim-
ulated to do so.
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Glossary
Action (Handlung): A resource consuming activity which is beneﬁcial
for another device
Agent: An entity that commits an action
Assessment (Bewertung): Part of the negotiation phase which assesses
actions and remunerations
Bond (Wertpapier): Collective term of notes and bills
Cooperation (Kooperation): Inter-device (horizontal) collaboration that
is aimed at maintaining the infrastructure or at adequately accessing the dis-
tributed resources
Dissemination (Weitergabe): Informing other entities about the local
view of a protocol entity’s reputation
Eﬀectiveness (Eﬀektivita¨t): (of an incentive scheme) The capability of
restraining misbehavior while exempting venial noncooperation
Flexible remuneration (Flexible Belohnung): see pricing
Incentive pattern (Anreizmuster): A pattern of stimulating coopera-
tion (collective, community, barter trade, bearer notes/bills, banking, ban-
knotes)
Incentive scheme (Anreizschema): A scheme that is composed of one
or more incentive subschemes
Lavish behavior (Verschwenderisches Verhalten): Proﬁtable misbe-
havior that is exhibited by the principal entity
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Malicious behavior (Bo¨swilliges Verhalten): Unproﬁtable misbehav-
ior that is exhibited by the agent or principal entity
Misbehavior (Fehlverhalten): Uncooperative behavior that is unrea-
sonable, i.e. that is not interpreted as venial noncooperation
Oﬄine: The absence of entities that are required to be globally accessible
Pricing (Preisﬁndung): Flexible assessment of the agent’s remunera-
tion; takes into account the scarceness of resources and the market position
of the participants
Principal (Prinzipal): An entity on the behalf of which is committed an
action
Remuneration (Belohnung/Verdienst): Compensates the agent for
having consumed its resources; handed over by the principal
Remuneration type (Belohnungsart): The means of remuneration (rep-
utation, action in return, bond)
Scalability (Skalierbarkeit): The capability of an incentive scheme of
being applicable, even if the number of entities it encompasses grows large
Selﬁsh behavior (Eigensinniges Verhalten): Proﬁtable misbehavior
that is exhibited by the agent entity
Sniﬃng (Schnu¨ﬀeln): Listening to messages or negotiations that are
destined for other entities
Stimulated cooperation (Angeregte Koooperation): A composition
of elementary stimulated cooperations
Trust (Vertrauen): Either an incentive for cooperation or a prerequisite
for remuneration mechanisms; accrues from certiﬁcates (static trust) or prior
experiences (dynamic trust)
Uncooperative behavior (Unkooperatives Verhalten): The lack or
absence of cooperation
Venial noncooperation (Verzeihliches Fehlverhalten): Uncoopera-
tive behavior that is reasonable, i.e. other entities are appreciative of it
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